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Abstract
We conduct an experiment in which we auction the scarce rights to play the Proposer and
Responder positions in subsequent ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate
these rights and then charge exogenous participation fees according to the auction price sequences
observed in the auction treatment. With endogenous selection into ultimatum games via auctions,
we ﬁnd that play converges to a session-speciﬁc Nash equilibrium and auction prices emerge which
support this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment and
exogenous participation fees, we ﬁnd play also converges to a session-speciﬁc Nash equilibrium as
predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. The Nash equilibrium observed within a session results
in low ultimatum game oﬀers, but the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is never observed.
JEL classiﬁcation: C92; C78; D44
Keywords: Ultimatum Bargaining; Auction; Forward Induction
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Introduction

Experimental ultimatum game studies consistently generate evidence refuting the joint hypothesis that participants are solely concerned with own monetary rewards and play according to the subgame perfection solution concept. While bargaining positions in these
experiments are typically endowed, in the naturally-occurring world people commonly acquire bargaining positions through some market allocation of resources. Some examples
are a building owner negotiating a lease with a medical practice, an aircraft manufacturer
negotiating with subcontractors, a telecommunication ﬁrm negotiating with another to purchase bandwidth licenses, and a law school graduate negotiating with a law ﬁrm over terms
of employment. When analyzing situations like these we should understand if behavioral
anomalies, like those consistently found in ultimatum game experiments, remain relevant.
We investigate this issue through an experiment in which scarce participation rights to play
an ultimatum game are allocated by auctions.
In the standard version of the ultimatum game there are two players, the Proposer and
the Responder, who have the opportunity to share ten one-dollar bills. The Proposer oﬀers
x dollars to the Responder, implicity demanding he keeps 10 − x dollars. The Responder
can then either Accept, implementing the implied division, or Reject, resulting in both
players receiving zero dollars. Formally, the Proposer’s strategy set is X = {0, 1, . . . , 10}
and the Responder’s strategy set is the set of functions that map elements of X to elements
of the action set {Accept, Reject}. In the unique strict subgame perfect equilibrium, the
Responder accepts any oﬀer of one or greater and the Proposer chooses to oﬀer one dollar.
While this subgame perfect equilibrium is the focus of most researchers’ attention1 there are
a multiplicity of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Any division of 10 − x and x for the Proposer
and Responder, respectively, is supported by the Nash equilibrium in which the Proposer’s
strategy is x and the Responder’s strategy is to reject all oﬀers strictly less than x and accept
1

An notable exception is the evolutionary learning model of Gale et al. (1995).
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all others.2 We call these threshold Nash equilibria.
The literature on ultimatum game experiments is extensive but has a common theme:
Proposers make diverse oﬀers between an even split and the smallest positive oﬀer, and
Responders often reject oﬀers that are less generous than an even split (Camerer, 2003).
This behavior is inconsistent with any pure strategy Nash equilibrium, let alone subgame
perfection. So why should we expect the auctioning of limited participation rights to aﬀect
play in the ultimatum game?
One reason is that auction prices may allow participants to forward induce the payoﬀ
expectations of other players, helping resolve the coordination problem when there are multiple Nash equilibria. A seminal investigation of the empirical validity of forward induction
through pre-game auctions is provided by Van Huyck et al. (1993), who report an experiment with nine-person symmetric median eﬀort games. In these games, a player’s payoﬀ is
increasing in the median eﬀort level of the group, and decreasing in the diﬀerence between
the player’s eﬀort level and the median. These games have a set of Pareto-ranked pure strategy Nash equilibria, one for each possible eﬀort level. After repeatedly playing the game
ten times in their experiment, play almost always converges to the initial median eﬀort level
of four or ﬁve. Then in another treatment, eighteen subjects participate in a multiple-unit
English clock auction each period to determine the nine subjects who will play in the game.
Strikingly, the auction prices rise to just below the game payoﬀ and play correspondingly
rises to the Pareto dominant equilibrium associated with maximum eﬀort.3
Our study diﬀers from Van Huyck et al. (1993) in two fundamental ways. First, the
asymmetric nature of the ultimatum game leads us to have two populations rather than
one: a group of potential Proposers and a group of potential Responders. In our Auction
treatment, we use two simultaneous multi-unit English clock auctions to allocate the scarce
2

There is one more pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which the Proposer oﬀers zero and the Responder
rejects oﬀers of any amount.
3
The impact of auctioning scarce participation rights has been explored in experiments considering various
strategic games such as provision point public goods (Broseta et al., 2003), Bertrand competition (Oﬀerman
and Potters, 2006), and battle of the sexes (Plott and Williamson, 2000).
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rights to play both ultimatum game positions, with ﬁnal prices the only auction information
revealed between populations. Hence, and in contrast to Van Huyck et al. (1993), forward
induction requires coordination of payoﬀ expectations between the Proposer and Responder
populations. Second, the Nash equilibria of the ultimatum game do not have a strict Pareto
ranking. Correspondingly, the Pareto-dominance equilibrium selection criterion is unable to
play a role in forward induction. Because of these diﬀerences, we are a priori hesitant to
assume that the Van Huyck et al. (1993) results extend to our setting.
As a natural benchmark for our Auction treatment, we conduct a control treatment in
which we keep constant the scarcity of participation rights and the payoﬀ opportunity sets of
players, but we remove the endogenous allocation of participation rights and determination
of participation fees. In what we call the Random treatment, every period and for each
game role we randomly select four out of the eight possible participants. We match the
payoﬀ opportunities to those in the Auction treatment by imposing a sequence of entry fees
identical to those generated in a paired Auction session. The Random treatment allows us
to separate the eﬀects of endogenous participation, and thus forward induction, from those
resulting from the auction price impact upon the payoﬀ structure of the ultimatum game.
The change in the payoﬀ structure of the game created by the auction prices in itself
can impact play according to the loss avoidance equilibrium selection principle. Cachon
and Camerer (1996) argue that players wish to avoid equilibrium play that results in a loss
(possibly relative to a reference point) and appreciate that other players wish the same.
Thus, the loss avoidance principle reﬁnes away any Nash equilibrium that involves a loss
for a player if there is an alternative equilibrium oﬀering non-losses to all players. They
demonstrate the loss avoidance principle by conducting experiments with the same median
eﬀort coordination game as Van Huyck et al. (1993). However, instead of an auction they
introduce exogenous entry fees. While the participation fee does not reﬂect an endogenous
expectation of game payoﬀs, Cachon and Camerer ﬁnd play coordinates on higher eﬀort
levels.
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A second reason why we should expect auctioning oﬀ limited participation rights to aﬀect
ultimatum game play is that competing and winning in an auction creates a stronger sense of
entitlement than simply endowing participation rights. Researchers conjecture this stronger
sense of entitlement should move player closer to the strict subgame perfect equilibrium.
The inﬂuential work of Hoﬀman et al. (1994) measures the impact of earned entitlement
by awarding Proposer positions to subjects scoring in the top ﬁfty percent of a general
knowledge quiz. In sessions with Proposers earning their position, one-shot game oﬀers are
substantially reduced while Responders maintain a low rejection rate.
Perhaps the most closely related work to the current study is Guth and Tietz (1986), who
also use auctions to allocate scarce rights to play the ultimatum game. In their experiment,
subjects participate in three rounds of decision making. In each round of play, subjects
are randomly partitioned into six subgroups and each subgroup is informed that they have
been randomly selected to play as either a Proposer or Responder in an ultimatum game of
size ﬁfteen, ﬁfty-ﬁve or one hundred Deutsche Marks. Then each subgroup participates in a
diﬀerent second-price sealed bid auction to determine the one member of the subgroup who
will ultimately participate in an ultimatum game. Finally the winners of the auctions are
appropriately paired and proceed to play the ultimatum games. Perhaps the most important
diﬀerence with our study is that subjects in the Guth and Tietz (1986) experiment only know
their own auction price. Hence, coordination based upon forward induction or loss avoidance
is not possible. Several results of the study are informative and game play diﬀers from typical
studies. Proposers’ average price is forty-eight percent of the pie size while the Responders’
average price is twenty-seven percent of the pie size. Proposers’ average oﬀer in the game
is thirty ﬁve-percent of the pie, and Responders only rejected four out of thirty-six oﬀers.
While this is a very low rejection rate, it is hard to argue that a Nash equilibrium is reached
because of heterogeneity in both Proposer play and the auction prices for both roles.
A third reason we can expect more Nash Equilibrium play in our experimental design is
the impact of learning. We allow for ﬁfteen periods in each of our sessions because a common
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and important feature of markets is repetition. Markets often require multiple repetitions
prior to converging to competitive equilibrium even in the simplest settings (Smith, 1962),
and thus one can conjecture we are most likely to obtain competitive prices and allocations
through repetition.
However, we note previous studies of simple repeated ultimatum games have provided
mixed evidence on whether players learn to play a Nash equilibrium. Slonim and Roth
(1998) conduct a ten round experiment with a random rematching of players each round.
They have three treatments: low, medium, and high stakes. For all three stake levels,
Proposers oﬀer over forty percent of the pie, but there is a signiﬁcant reduction in rejection
rates going from the high- to the low-stakes treatment. The only signiﬁcant play adjustment
over time is that high-stakes Proposers learn to decrease their oﬀers. Cooper et al. (2003)
examine a much longer sequence of plays – typically ﬁfty rounds – and ﬁnd nonsigniﬁcant
growth in oﬀer size and dispersion over time, but more importantly they observe reduced
rejection rates over time for oﬀers of less than thirty percent of the pie. List and Cherry
(2000) adopt a 10 period random matching protocol, but ﬁrst determine whether a Proposer
negotiates over a twenty or one hundred dollar pie size by relative performance on a set of
GMAT exam questions. Consistent with their design goals, the entitlements lead to less
generous distributions of oﬀers and greater rejection rates than found in the other repeated
ultimatum game experiments. However, in the high stakes treatments these rejection rates
fall signiﬁcantly and are below ﬁfteen percent the last three periods.

2

Experimental Procedures

Our experiment consists of ten sessions, with sixteen subjects in each session. Half of the
subjects within a session are randomly assigned to the Proposer group, and the other half
to the Responder group. In each of the 15 rounds of a session, four subjects from each of
the two groups are selected to play a single iteration of the ultimatum game and pay a price
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for the right to play.4
The procedure to assign participation rights and determine participation fees diﬀers by
treatment, and the treatments are across subjects. In the Auction treatment, we conduct
two multi-unit uniform price English clock auctions at the beginning of each round: one to
determine the four Proposers and their participation fee, and another to determine the four
Responders and their participation fee. We conduct ﬁve sessions of the Auction treatment,
followed by ﬁve sessions of the Random treatment. In the Random treatment, we select four
subjects at random from each of the Proposer and Responder groups at the beginning of
each round. For the participation fees, we link each Random session to a diﬀerent Auction
session, and impose the sequence of auction prices as the sequence of exogenous participation
fees for the Random session.
Every ultimatum game in our experiment has a pie size of ten dollars, and with positive
participation prices it’s possible for a subject to have negative proﬁts in a round. Hence, every
subject is endowed with an initial ﬁfteen dollar currency balance. This is not a loan, and
thus a subject who participates in none of the games over the ﬁfteen rounds will exit the lab
with twenty dollars.5 We chose the endowed budget not so small it would be immediately
binding, but it may become a binding constraint if a subject repeatedly makes decisions
resulting in losses. We feel liquidity constraints that can become binding from repeatedly
poor outcomes is a natural part of a market allocation process.6
The multi-unit uniform price English auction commences with an initial clock price of
zero, and all eight bidders are initially “in” the auction. As the auction price ticks upward,
bidders can make an irreversible decision to exit the auction. The price clock remains at
the opening price of zero for ﬁve seconds (giving an ample exit opportunity for those with
a strong desire not to participate) and subsequently rises ten cents ($0.10) every second
thereafter. As soon as at least four subjects exit the auction, the auction ends and the
4

Subject instructions are provided at http://excen.gsu.edu/swarthout/AU/ .
A ﬁve dollar show-up payment was given to each subject.
6
In the experiment, the presence of liquidity constrained participants is infrequent. There is never an
auction in which more than two participants have currency balances less than the ultimate auction price.
5
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current clock price is paid by the four winning subjects.7
A subject typically exits an auction by clicking a button displayed on the computer
screen. However, there are two instances in which the software automatically exits a subject.
First, the software enforces a liquidity constraint; if the clock price exceeds a subject’s
currency balance he is automatically exited from the auction. Second, if the auction reaches
a maximum price of ten dollars then four winners are randomly selected from the remaining
bidders.
While both auction prices are announced to all subjects prior to the ultimatum game
phase, there is no information transmission between the Proposer and Responder auctions
during the auctions. While an auction is in progress, subjects in a given auction see only
information about their own auction, including the number of bidders remaining. Also, the
complete history of all auction prices from previous rounds is always shown on the screen,
making the history of auction prices public information for all subjects.
In the Random treatment sessions, we allocate the scarce participation rights by randomly
selecting four Proposers and four Responders to proceed to the ultimatum game phase each
round. Each Random session is linked to a diﬀerent Auction session, and the imposed
participation prices each round are the same prices realized in the matched Auction session.
However, we don’t explain or suggest the source of these prices to the subjects in the Random
treatment. Further, we want to ensure these subjects believe these prices are exogenous
and in no way determined by their actions. To this end, We stated the following in the
instructions:
. . . Prices can vary across periods. These prices have been pre-selected, and your
decisions today will have no inﬂuence on them. We have placed a list of the 15
group A prices and group B prices in the sealed envelope you see taped on the
whiteboard at the front of the room. At the conclusion of this experiment, we
will open this envelope and project this list of prices on the screens. Please use
this opportunity to verify that the prices were in fact selected beforehand.
7

In the event of an exit tie at the close of the auction, random selection from the subjects exiting on the
ﬁnal tick determines whether each of these tied bidders successfully exits or instead wins.
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The ultimatum game phase protocols are the same in both our treatments. The four
Proposers and four Responders are randomly formed into game pairs. A proposer chooses
a division of ten one dollar bills (i.e., only integer proposals). This proposal is presented to
the Responder who chooses to either accept or reject the proposal. After resolution of the
ultimatum bargaining, the subjects’ currency balances are adjusted to reﬂect the prices paid
for the participation rights and the game outcomes. In our experiment, the game outcomes
are private information. Thus the decisions and outcomes of a pair are not revealed in
anyway to the other participants. To summarize, a subject knows all the prices of completed
auctions (or past exogenous participation fees) and also the outcomes of the games in which
he participated.

3

Results

In this section we show the extent to which play converges to a session-speciﬁc threshold
Nash equilibrium and corresponding auction prices support only this equilibrium. With respect to Proposer play in the ultimatum game, the distribution of oﬀers is characterized
by low variance and a high frequency mode. Further, as we condition on time and session
the frequency of the modal oﬀer increases, indicating cross-session heterogeneity. Responders overwhelmingly accept modal or greater oﬀers and reject oﬀers below the mode at a
high rate. In the Auction treatment, prices converge to levels such that forward induction
accurately predicts the observed Nash Equilibrium. In matched Random and Auction treatment sessions, the same Nash equilibrium is typically played, providing support for the loss
avoidance selection criterion. Speciﬁcally, in three matched session pairs we observe Nash
equilibrium play corresponding to an oﬀer of 3, and in the other two matched session pairs
we see Nash equilibrium play corresponding to oﬀer sizes of 2 and 4. We never observe play
at the subgame perfect equilibrium.

9

3.1

Play in the ultimatum game

The average Proposer’s oﬀer and Responder’s rejection rate are $3.18 and 12.7%, respectively, in the Auction treatment, and $3.58 and 9.0%, respectively, in the Random treatment.
While clearly inconsistent with the subgame perfect prediction, these values are close to the
observed minimum values seen in several experiments that attempt to facilitate subgame
perfect play using treatments such as earned entitlement of role (Guth and Tietz, 1986;
Hoﬀman et al., 1994), suggestive framing and stake size (Andersen et al., 2011), and repetition with random matching (List and Cherry, 2000; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Cooper et al.,
2003) or ﬁxed matching (Slembeck, 1999). Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the results
of various treatments from these studies; the x-axis is the treatment average proportion of
the pie oﬀered, and the y-axis is the total proportion of oﬀers rejected. We mark the observations from our Auction and Random treatments with the triangles. Our low rejection
rates are roughly consistent with Nash equilibrium play by Responders even at this highly
aggregated level. However, we need to consider a more disaggregated view of the data to
make conclusions regarding Proposer play.
One sees closer adherence to threshold Nash equilibrium play by inspecting the distribution of oﬀers and the conditional rejection rates in Table 1. In the Auction treatment, we see
the distribution of oﬀers is quite narrow. Over 92% of the oﬀers are between 2 and 4 with a
pronounced modal oﬀer of 3 chosen 48.3% of the time. Oﬀers in the Random treatment also
have a narrow distribution; over 91% are between 3 and 5, with a less pronounced mode of
4. There is a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect as we reject that the mean oﬀer is the same in both
the Auction and Random treatments at any reasonable level of signiﬁcance.8 With respect
to Responder behavior, conditional rejection rates are suggestive of threshold Nash behavior:
rejection rates are very low for oﬀers greater than or equal to the mode, and rejection rates
increase dramatically for oﬀers less than the mode.
8

A Welch two-sample t-test for diﬀerences in means yields a t-stat of -5.78 and, with 597 degrees-offreedom, a p-value well below 0.001.
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Figure 1: Proportions oﬀered and rejection rates across studies and treatments
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One reason to expect that play may be more consistent with a Nash equilibrium is that
forward induction based on the auction prices reduces strategic uncertainty. However, the
formation of auction prices leading subjects to coordinate on a Nash equilibrium may take
time. So we disaggregate the data in Table 1 into ﬁve-period time blocks: periods 1-5, periods
6-10, and periods 11-15. Table 2 provides this summary of early, middle, and late session
play. The Proposers’ modal oﬀer, highlighted for each sub-sample by bold-faced entries,
decreases in the latter time blocks while the frequency of modal play correspondingly grows.
We also see the Responders’ rejection rate for oﬀers greater than or equal to the mode fall to
very low levels, and rejection rates for oﬀers strictly less than the mode are consistently much
higher. While this time disaggregated view shows stronger Nash consistent play over time,
this consistency is still understated by the aggregation across individual sessions. Shortly we
show how diﬀerent sessions are consistent with alternative threshold Nash equilibria. But
for now we simply state the average frequency of the modal oﬀer within a period and session
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Table 1: Gross oﬀer distributions, conditional rejection rates, and basic
statistics
Auction
Oﬀer

% Oﬀered (n)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

0.3
2.0
15.7
48.3
28.3
5.3
0.0

All

(1)
(6)
(47)
(145)
(85)
(16)
(0)

100.0 (300)

Mean

Random

% Rejected (n)
100.0
66.7
23.4
12.4
4.7
0.0
–

(1)
(4)
(11)
(18)
(4)
(0)

12.7 (38)

% Oﬀered (n)
0.0
0.3
7.7
38.3
41.3
12.0
0.3

% Rejected (n)

(0)
(1)
(23)
(115)
(124)
(36)
(1)

–
100.0
39.1
10.4
4.0
0.0
0.0

100.0 (300)

3.18

(1)
(9)
(12)
(5)
(0)
(0)

9.0 (27)

3.58

is over 75% – i.e., on average three out of the four Proposers’ oﬀers are the same in the last
ﬁve periods of a session.

Table 2: Gross oﬀer distributions, conditional rejection rates, and basic statistics over
blocks of ﬁve periods
Auction
Rounds 1-5

Rounds 6-10

Random
Rounds 11-15

Rounds 1-5

Rounds 6-10

Rounds 11-15

Oﬀer

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

Oﬀ
(%)

Rej
(%)

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

0.0
0.0
9.0
36.0
42.0
13.0
0.0

–
–
44.4
22.2
2.4
0.0
–

0.0
3.0
10.0
50.0
34.0
3.0
0.0

–
33.3
30.0
10.0
8.8
0.0
–

1.0
3.0
28.0
59.0
9.0
0.0
0.0

100.0
100.0
14.3
8.5
0.0
–
–

0.0
0.0
5.0
27.0
46.0
22.0
0.0

–
–
60.0
25.9
6.5
0.0
–

0.0
0.0
4.0
33.0
51.0
12.0
0.0

–
–
50.0
12.1
3.9
0.0
–

0.0
1.0
14.0
55.0
27.0
2.0
1.0

–
100.0
28.6
1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0

All

100.0

13.0

100.0

12.0

100.0

13.0

100.0

13.0

100.0

8.0

100.0

6.0

Mean

3.59

3.24

2.72

3.85

3.71

3.18

Note: a bold-faced value denotes the mode of the distribution.

We further explore whether Proposers’ oﬀer proﬁles converge within a session, especially
relative to other studies, by considering the sample variance of the four oﬀers within a speciﬁc
period and session. In Figure 2, we plot by treatment the time series of this statistic averaged
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across the ﬁve sessions. We also plot the comparable time series from the treatments of other
repeated ultimatum game experiments which employed a random rematching protocol.9 This
ﬁgure clearly shows lower oﬀer sample variances in our treatments, indicating more Nash
equilibrium coordination than studies with simple repetition with random rematching.
Figure 2: Within session oﬀer variances across studies and treatments
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3.2

Auction prices and equilibrium selection

We now turn our attention to the realized Proposer and Responder auction prices. Our analysis focuses on whether, within a session, prices emerge that are consistent with a threshold
Nash equilibrium. Let P1 be the price from the Proposer auction, and P2 be the price from
the Responder auction. Recall, according to forward induction, an auction winner expects an
ultimatum game payoﬀ at least as large as the incurred auction price. For an auction-winning
Proposer this implies making an oﬀer no greater than 10 − P1 , and for an auction-winning
9

For those studies with more than 15 periods, we only report the ﬁrst 15 periods.
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Responder this implies receiving an ultimatum oﬀer no less than P2 . We deﬁne a payoﬀ
expectation consistent (PEC hereafter) oﬀer as any oﬀer between P2 and 10 − P1 .
We conjecture Proposers make PEC oﬀers when feasible, and Responders accordingly
accept. According to the reﬁnement concepts of forward induction and loss avoidance, a
Nash equilibrium in the ultimatum game is selected when there is a unique PEC oﬀer.
However, when P2 exceeds 10 − P1 , then the sum of the prices is greater than 10. This not
only reﬂects uncoordinated beliefs, but also results in a negative net pie size, which means
no oﬀer can provide both players with non-negative period payoﬀs.10
At the beginning of a session there is little reason to expect such equilibrium beliefs
and corresponding prices. So we examine the evolution of 10 − P1 and P2 in each Auction
session by plotting these time series in Figure 3. In four out of ﬁve Auction sessions, early
period prices reﬂect non-equilibrium beliefs. In price sequences 1, 2, and 4 we observe one
or more early periods in which P2 exceeds 10 − P1 , and in sequence 3 we observe initial
prices that allow for multiple possible mutually-proﬁtable oﬀer levels. In each sequence we
observe prices reach and maintain values that support a unique oﬀer level. One confound is
a possible end-of-experiment eﬀect in three sessions. In Price Sequences 1, 4, and 5 we see
sudden price drops leading to multiple PEC oﬀer levels.
Given a set of realized auction prices (or participation fees, in the case of the Random
treatment), does the subsequent sequence of ultimatum game outcomes consist of accepted
PEC oﬀers? We ﬁrst address this question with a visualization of the fully disaggregated
data of ultimatum game play overlayed with the price variables 10 − P1 and P2 in Figure 4.
This ﬁgure consists of ﬁve plots, one for each price sequence. The y-axis in each plot is price
and the x-axis is period. Notice that each period is separated into halves by a light grey
vertical line. Oﬀers from the Auction treatment are plotted on the left side of this line with
squares, and oﬀers from the matched Random treatment are plotted on the right side of the
line with circles. An open marker shows an accepted oﬀer, and a ﬁlled marker indicates a
10

Note that it is also possible to have a price where 10−P1 −1 exceeds P2 but there is no PEC oﬀer. In this
case the proposer must decide whether to impose a non-positive period payoﬀ on himself or the responder.
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Figure 3: Plots of 10 − P1 and P2 for the Five Price Sequences
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rejected oﬀer. Two horizontal lines span each period: the solid line is 10 − P1 and the dashed
line is P2 .
Each price sequence generates distinct patterns of behavior. We brieﬂy discuss each of
these.
Price Sequence 1: Initial high prices and negative net pies in periods 2 through 4 correspond to high varying oﬀers. However, in the middle periods, oﬀers and prices coordinate
on the oﬀer size of 3. Interestingly, the Proposers’ auction price in period 12 is exactly 7
and then prices and play start to adjust to an equilibrium oﬀer of 2 as the sequence ends.
Price Sequence 2: A very high initial Responder auction price results in strategic uncertainty and a lack of PEC oﬀers available in ﬁve of the ﬁrst seven periods. Correspondingly,
there is signiﬁcant variance in the chosen oﬀers. In periods 9 through 14, only the oﬀer of
4 is PEC with the auction prices, but 3 is the modal oﬀer in both treatments. In the ﬁnal
period, the Responder’s price drops below three to making this oﬀer PEC.
Price Sequence 3: Prices and play show a very clear trend of a decreasing selection of
the oﬀer from 5 to 3.
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Figure 4: All play in Ultimatum Games with 10 − P1 and P2 superimposed
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Price Sequence 4: Initial prices do not provide a PEC oﬀer and quickly adjust to give
varying support for the oﬀer level of 4. Game play is largely consistent with this until period
9. Then we start to see some very low oﬀers in the Auction treatment, a number of which
are rejected. This is followed by diverging prices and an increasing spread in oﬀers, in both
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treatments, as strategic uncertainty increases.
Price Sequence 5: Price and play quickly settle on the oﬀer of 4. But then Proposers
in the auction treatment increasingly make oﬀers of 3, which leads to Responders’ auction
prices falling to just below 3. In the last period the large drop in the Responders’ price
creates multiple PEC oﬀer amounts and consequently a wider range of oﬀers.
We summarize the coordination between auction prices and game play by reporting, for
the stage games having feasible PEC outcomes, the frequency of PEC oﬀers and corresponding rejections. Table 3 summarizes play from the 252 games in each treatment with prices
resulting in the availability of PEC oﬀers. We classify oﬀers made in these games according
to whether they are PEC, strictly less than P2 , or strictly greater than 10 − P1 . We also
report the same counts for the subset of 120 games that have a unique feasible PEC outcome.
Our ﬁrst observation is that when Proposers can make PEC oﬀers they do so 64% of the time
in the Auction treatment, and 77% of the time in the Random treatment. When a unique
PEC oﬀer exists, these respective proportions fall to 48% and 63%. In each case, a binomial
test rejects these proportions as the same across the two treatments at any reasonable level
of signiﬁcance.
PEC oﬀers are rarely rejected. Responders only reject 1 out of 162 PEC oﬀers in the
Auction treatment and only 4 out of 194 PEC oﬀers in the Random treatment. However,
in the case of oﬀers less than P2 there is a striking increase in the rejection rates: 27 out 88
cases in the Auction treatment and 14 out of 46 cases in the Random treatment.
Table 3: Counts of PEC oﬀers, non-PEC oﬀers, and corresponding rejections conditional on
P2 ≤ 10 − P1 in the 300 stage games of each treatment
Auction treatment

Random treatment

PEC Oﬀers Available

Unique PEC Oﬀer

PEC Oﬀers Available

Unique PEC Oﬀer

Count

Rejections

Count

Rejections

Count

Rejections

Count

Rejections

PEC Oﬀer
Oﬀer < P2
Oﬀer > 10 − P1

162
88
2

1
27
0

58
60
2

1
11
0

194
46
12

4
14
0

75
35
10

4
4
0

Sum

252

28

120

12

252

18

120

8
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The greater likelihood of PEC oﬀers in the Random treatment provides insight into the
treatment eﬀect of higher oﬀers in the Random treatment than in the Auction treatment.
The greater propensity of PEC oﬀers in the Random treatment suggests that exogenous sunk
participation costs bolster loss avoidance behavior more so than endogenous sunk costs from
auctions. One explanation for this behavior is that market allocation of participation rights
may cause subjects to be less averse to imposing losses on others. Alternatively, the auction
process may lead to self-selection of subjects who are more likely to impose losses on others.
We conclude the paper with a discussion of this issue.

4

Discussion

At the outset we oﬀered two distinct motivations why auctioning participation rights may
impact behavior in the ultimatum game. On one hand, the game-theoretic equilibrium
selection concepts of forward induction and loss avoidance provide a basis for auction prices to
reduce strategic uncertainty and encourage the play of a threshold Nash equilibrium. On the
other hand, behavioral economics suggests that introducing the auction phase can inﬂuence
the norms or social preferences players hold, by moving from endowed to earned entitlements
of player positions. If these factors indeed accurately characterize human behavior, we should
see movement towards – and in the extreme case complete convergence to – subgame perfect
play. We observe stronger coordination on oﬀers by Proposers than seen previously, as well
as Responder behavior consistent with the associated threshold Nash equilibrium. Thus, we
conclude the more game-theoretic story holds, since a Nash equilibrium is selected. While
it is never the subgame perfect one, the oﬀers are quite low and we observe less demand for
fairness by responders. So why are the selected equilibria associated with larger shares for
the Proposer but never the subgame perfect one?
We conjecture the selection of equilibria with game payoﬀ proﬁles such as (8,2) and
(7,3) rather than (9,1) could arise from a lemons market phenomenon. Speciﬁcally, the
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market allocation of participation rights leads to an endogenous separation of diﬀerent social
preferences types rather than alteration of preferences by changing the decision context.
Imagine one potential Responder who has a rather strong preference for equal splits in
the bargaining phase and a second potential Responder who has concern only for his own
monetary payoﬀ. If a history of auction prices align such that there is a likely expectation
of an oﬀer of 7, then the second responder is likely to have a higher willingness-to-pay than
the ﬁrst in the auction.
In the selection of a threshold Nash equilibrium, it’s crucial that the set of Responder
auction winners contain only those who will accept the Proposers’ oﬀer. Thus, a selected
equilibrium must include an oﬀer large enough that it generates a correspondingly high
enough price to sort out the “lemon” Responders whose preferences would lead them to
reject the equilibrium oﬀer. At the subgame perfect equilibrium where the oﬀer is 9, the
supporting auction prices would be greater than $8 for the Proposers and less $1 for the
Responders. At such a low participation price for Responders, it’s likely that someone with
preferences consistent with rejecting an oﬀer 9 – even when he has a high expectation of that
oﬀer – could be selected to the bargaining phase. So we can see that the market allocation of
participation rights can facilitate the selection of a Nash equilibrium, but it must be one in
which the Responder’s price is high enough to provide enough separation of social preference
types so that all auction winners will accept the equilibrium oﬀer.11
While this lemons market conjecture is intuitive, unfortunately it is diﬃcult to test. One
of the primary diﬃculties is the formulation of an individual’s certainty equivalent to play
the ultimatum game. When formulating a bid, which in theory is this certainty equivalent,
the potential player must formulate a subjective probability distribution over the joint payoﬀ
outcomes in the subsequent game. Then if his preferences are over joint payoﬀ earnings, how
does that translate into a certainty equivalent which is deﬁned solely over his own wealth?
Future eﬀorts will be made to answer these questions and design an experiment to directly
11

The idea that entry prices and opportunity costs can lead to a sorting equilibrium based on social
preference types is a generalization of the concepts presented in Lazear et al. (2012).
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address these issues.
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